Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky by Diamond, Shari Seidman et al.
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 7
Issue 1 Fall 1997 Article 5
Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v.
Kentucky
Shari Seidman Diamond
Leslie Ellis
Elisabeth Schmidt
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Diamond, Shari Seidman; Ellis, Leslie; and Schmidt, Elisabeth (1997) "Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky,"
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol7/iss1/5
REALISTIC RESPONSES TO THE LIMITATIONS
OF BATSON v. KENTUCKY
Shari Seidman Diamond, t Leslie Ellis, tt and Elisabeth Schmidtttt
The modem view of the jury, expressed in recent years in Batson v.
Kentucky' and its progeny, is of an institution made up of citizens who
view themselves and who should be viewed by others as color-blind and
gender-neutral. From this viewpoint, the racial and gender make-up of a
particular jury should not affect the fairness or legitimacy of the jury's
verdict, for the color-blind view assumes that the race or gender of a
juror does not affect that juror's verdict preference. Rather, what matters
for fairness and legitimacy is that the jury selection process has not sys-
tematically removed legally eligible citizens based on their race 2 or
gender.3
The procedures outlined in Batson were intended to prevent parties
from using race in the exercise of their peremptory challenges. 4 Justice
Marshall predicted that the procedures would fail to meet that goal.5
Several scholars who have examined jury selection in the aftermath of
Batson suggest that Justice Marshall was correct.6 As a result, they have
argued that the elimination of peremptory challenges is the only way to
prevent race- and gender-based excuses.7
After briefly describing the exercise of challenges in the jury selec-
tion process and how Batson and its progeny purported to change the
exercise of peremptory challenges, we examine the available evidence
t Professor of Psychology and Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago and
Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation. B.A. 1968, University of Michigan; Ph.D.
1972, Northwestern University; J.D. 1985, University of Chicago Law School.
ft Graduate Student, University of Illinois at Chicago and Research Assistant, American
Bar Foundation. B.A. 1994, Northwestern University.
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1 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
2 See id.
3 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
4 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-89.
5 See id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
6 See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 209 (1989); Kenneth
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 71 Noa DAME L. REv. 447, 503 (1996); Karen Bray, Reaching the Final Chapter in
the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. Rnv. 517, 564-66 (1992).
7 See supra note 6; see also Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges
and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tax. L. Rnv. 1041, 1044 (1995).
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for Batson's lack of impact on the exercise of the peremptory challenge.
Next, we discuss why the promise of Batson has not been met in light of
the requirements for a successful Batson challenge. Then, using data
from peremptory challenges in pre-Batson cases, we evaluate the likely
consequences of eliminating peremptory challenges. Finally, we revisit
notions of impartiality and bias as we consider potential remedies to
maximize jury heterogeneity and representativeness without eliminating
peremptory challenges.
I. VOIR DIRE AND THE EXERCISE OF CHALLENGES
Individuals summoned for jury duty who meet the general qualifica-
tions for jury service (e.g., citizenship, age, and residency) go through a
final screening process called voir dire before they are seated on a petit
jury in a particular case. During the voir dire, the potential jurors are
questioned, at times briefly but occasionally quite extensively, about
their background and attitudes by the judge alone and, increasingly less
often, by the attorneys.8
Either the judge or a party, through his or her attorney, can excuse a
prospective juror. Excused jurors are removed by challenges for cause or
by peremptory challenges. The judge may excuse a juror for cause if: 1)
that juror explicitly admits he or she cannot be impartial due to a per-
sonal belief, prejudice, or bias for or against one of the parties, or about
the case in general; or 2) the judge determines from the juror's answers
during the voir dire that the juror is unable or unwilling to decide the
case on the basis of the evidence and the law.9 The judge may remove a
juror for cause either on the judge's own motion or in response to an
attorney's motion.10
The right to challenge jurors based upon evidence of bias or preju-
dice-that is, to excuse jurors for cause-existed at English common law
and was adopted by the colonies, individually and in the Declaration of
Rights of the First Continental Congress in 1774.1 The right has been
interpreted by some as part of the constitutional right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury.' 2 Challenges for cause are unlimited in number. 13
8 See Gordon Bermant & John Shapard, The Voir Dire Examination, Juror Challenges
and Adversary Advocacy, in THE TRIAL PROCESS 69, 81 (Bruce Dennis Sales ed., 1981).
9 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 973-74 (2d ed.
1992) (listing several reasons why judges would excuse a juror).
10 See, e.g., ARIz. R. Crum. P. 18.4(b).
11 See LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 66, 95
(1993).
12 See Andrea B. Horowitz, Note, Ross v. Oklahoma: A Strike Against Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 1990 Wis. L. Rnv. 219, 238.
13 See LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 9, at 973.
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A potential juror may also be excused by one of the parties when his
or her attorney uses a peremptory challenge. In Swain v. Alabama,14 the
United States Supreme Court defined peremptory challenges as "chal-
lenges without cause, without explanation and without judicial scru-
tiny."'15 Peremptory challenges have been a part of the justice system in
the United States since 1790,16 but the use of the peremptory challenge is
not constitutionally guaranteed. The right to eliminate jurors without
stating a reason has not been recognized as being included in the consti-
tutional right to due process, a fair and impartial jury, or a cross-section
of the community, 17 but is provided for in federal and all state statutory
jury procedures.' 8
The number of peremptory challenges each party can exercise is
limited and varies widely across jurisdictions. The maximum number
within a jurisdiction often depends on the type of case (more challenges
are permitted in more serious cases). For example, in New York, each
side receives fifteen challenges if the highest crime with which the de-
fendant is charged is either a class B or C felony, while each side re-
ceives twenty challenges if the highest crime with which the defendant is
charged is a class A felony. 19 In criminal cases the number of challenges
allotted to the defendant may equal the number allotted to the prosecu-
tion 2° or it may exceed that number.21 Judges also have some discretion
in determining the maximum number of potential peremptory challenges
and may, for example, allot the statutorily prescribed number of chal-
lenges to each defendant when the case involves multiple defendants.22
In 1986, Batson placed a limit on the exercise of all peremptory
challenges, forbidding prosecutors from using juror race as a basis for
striking jurors who are the same race as the defendant. 23 Over the past
eleven years, the Supreme Court has expanded this prohibition to cover
defense attorneys in criminal cases, 24 and attorneys in civil cases. 25
Powers v. Ohio26 extended Batson further, making it unlawful to strike a
juror because of his or her race, whether or not the juror is of the same
14 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
15 Id. at 211-12.
16 See id. at 214 (citing I Stat. 119 (1790)).
17 See Melilli, supra note 6, at 447.
18 See id. at 447-48.
19 See N.Y. CPu,. PRoc. § 270.25 2(a)-(b) (McKinney 1993 & Supp: 1997).
20 See, e.g., 726 ILL. Coup. STAT. ANN. 5/115-4(e) (West Supp. 1997); Axuz. R. Ciui. P.
18.4(c); N.Y. Cum. PRoc. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1996).
21 See FED. R. Cium. P. 24(b).
22 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 3.350(d) (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
23 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
24 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
25 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
26 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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race as the defendant. In J.E.B. v. Alabama27, the prohibition was ex-
tended to forbid gender as well as race as a basis for the exercise of
peremptory challenges. 28 Taken together, these cases mandate that, re-
gardless of the type of case and who is doing the striking, it is unlawful
to use peremptory strikes to eliminate jurors systematically from a petit
jury because of their race or gender, or because of an "incorrect" as-
sumption that they will not be able to be impartial due to their race.
The Court's decisions in Batson and the subsequent cases have fo-
cused greater scrutiny on the exercise of peremptory challenges. The
evidence accumulated thus far, however, suggests that the increased
scrutiny has not resulted in the elimination of race-based challenges. We
turn next to the evidence that Batson has failed to alter race-based exer-
cises of peremptory challenges. We then discuss likely explanations for
that failure.
1I. BATSON PROCEDURES AND THEIR EFFECTS
The Court in Batson delineated a three-step procedure for examin-
ing a potential Batson violation. First, the complaining attorney must
establish a prima facie case to support the claim that the opposing party
has exercised its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion.29
Second, if the judge believes a prima facie case has been made, the bur-
den shifts to the accused party, who must offer a race-neutral explanation
for the contested challenges. 30 Finally, the trial court judge must decide
whether the offered explanation is sufficient to rebut the claim that the
challenge was racially motivated.31
Since Batson was decided, numerous litigants have raised so-called
Batson challenges, and parties have appealed trial court decisions based
on those challenges. Kenneth Melilli examined virtually all federal and
state civil and criminal cases published between April 30, 1986 (when
Batson was decided) and December 31, 1993.32 He identified all cases in
which there was both a Batson claim and decision, and found 1,156 Bat-
son complainants during that time period.33 The majority of those com-
plainants were not ultimately successful because the party charged with
the Batson violation was able to provide a neutral explanation that was
acceptable to the judge.3 4 Only eighteen percent of those attorneys
27 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
28 Id. at 131.
29 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
30 See id. at 97.
31 See id. at 96-98.
32 See Melilli, supra note 6, at 448.
33 See id. at 457.
34 See id. at 460.
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charged with basing challenges on race were found to be in violation of
Batson.35
Of course a low rate of success does not necessarily indicate that
valid complaints are being defeated. A review of explanations that have
been accepted as neutral when a challenge has been raised, however,
suggests a reluctance on the part of trial and appellate courts to reject
even the most minimal explanations offered to rebut a Batson challenge.
For instance, in United States v. Romero-Reyna36 the prosecutor excused
a Hispanic juror who worked as a pipeline worker because his job title
began with the letter p.37 The District Court rejected this explanation,38
but at a later hearing the attorney recalled that he had excused the juror
because pipeline workers are known for smoking marijuana.3 9 The Dis-
trict Court accepted that explanation.40 In Purkett v. Elem,4 1 long hair
and a beard were enough to justify the prosecutor's decision to excuse
two African-American jurors.42
This record suggests that the promise of Batson has not been ful-
filled. Note, however, that it does not mean that Batson has been totally
ineffective. Researchers who have examined the impact of Batson have
looked only at cases in which Batson challenges have been mounted. 43
If Batson has produced any educative or deterrent effect that has reduced
the number of peremptory challenges that prosecutors or defense attor-
neys would otherwise use to strike jurors based on race, that effect would
not be revealed in the cases involving Batson complaints. The most di-
rect test of the effect of Batson would compare the racial make-up of
juries in the years preceding and following Batson.44 That is a test that
has not yet been conducted.
In any case, available evidence suggests that -Batson has not effec-
tively prevented the intrusion of race into the jury selection process.45
This failure arises from the ambiguous grounds for most peremptory
challenges. If legitimate peremptory challenges after Batson remain
"challenges without cause, without explanation 46 as long as they are not
based on race or gender, then they can be based merely on the attorney's
35 See id.
36 889 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1989).
37 See id. at 560.
38 See id.
39 See id. at 561.
40 See id.
41 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
42 Id. at 768.
43 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6.
44 It would be desirable to examine the racial make-up of challenged jurors as well, but
courts do not typically keep records on the identity of jurors excused during voir dire.
45 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6.
46 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
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wise or foolish hunch. The trial court is then left in the difficult position
of distinguishing these from race- or gender-based decisions. In the
modem voir dire, the attorney generally has limited information on
which to base peremptory challenge decisions,47 so that hunches derived
from feelings, intuition, and stereotypes may be the basis for all chal-
lenges.48 Thus, it actually may be a beard or a wink or a gruff reply that
evokes a challenge.
If an attorney excuses a juror based on the juror's race and is chal-
lenged under Batson, the attorney is likely to give an explanation for the
challenge that sounds much like a hunch. The judge then must distin-
guish between a "real" hunch and a fake hunch being used to conceal an
illegitimate peremptory challenge, an exercise in mind-reading that
courts are understandably inclined to resist. The appellate court is even
more constrained because, in addition to the usual deference to the trial
court, it lacks access to cues that are not contained in the written
record.4
9
Thus, unless an attorney offers an explanation that would apply
equally to a juror of a different race or gender whom the attorney has
retained (e.g., the attorney says she excused a juror because he works for
the post office and both a challenged minority juror and a retained white
juror are postal employees), it is difficult to identify a race- or gender-
based challenge. Prospective jurors differ from one another on a host of
dimensions, and the resourceful attorney can generally point with ease to
a distinguishing non-race and non-gender characteristic to justify a par-
ticular challenge.
Even if the judge suspects that the attorney's real reason for the
challenge is race or gender, the judge may be reluctant to act. When a
judge finds that a Batson violation has occurred after the attorney offers a
purportedly neutral explanation for excusing the juror, the judge is really
saying that the attorney has lied to the court in denying that he or she
engaged in intentional discrimination. Thus, while the typical voir dire
provides limited information, judges generally cannot determine with
any assurance that a race- or gender-based challenge has been exercised
in any particular case and are understandably reluctant to reject even ap-
parently flimsy explanations. It is only when the pattern of excuses is
extreme (e.g., the prosecutor eliminates the only five blacks on the panel)
that the ambiguity is reduced. Therefore, it is only as a deterrent and at
47 See discussion infra Part IV.
48 In high-stakes or high-profile cases consultants may have collected survey or focus
group data that influence decisions on peremptory challenges. The reference here is to the
typical case in which the litigants do not obtain such assistance.
49 See, e.g., United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. Rose, 589
P.2d 5, 13 (Axiz. 1978) (entire voir dire process is best left to the discretion of the trial court
judge).
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the extremes (i.e., do not excuse all of the minority group members) that
Batson controls are likely to have much impact. Batson's ineffectiveness
has led to a search for alternative remedies for racial discrimination in
jury selection.
III. DECISIONS BY JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS DURING
VOIR DIRE
The elimination of peremptory challenges accompanied by an ex-
pansion of grounds for challenges for cause is the remedy many com-
mentators have proposed for avoiding race-based challenges in the wake
of Batson.50 We turn now to a set of trials conducted in the pre-Batson
era to assess how this reform might affect jury selection. The standard
voir dire provides limited information to judges who must make deci-
sions on challenges for cause and to attorneys who must decide when to
exercise their peremptory challenges. As we will show, under these cir-
cumstances judges excuse jurors for cause only on rare occasions, and
attorneys faced with this limited information rely on relatively crude ste-
reotypes and assumptions in exercising their peremptory challenges.
Nonetheless, even the minimal information available to attorneys pro-
vides enough detail on each juror to justify exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge to excuse that juror on grounds other than race or gender.
The data we report here were collected as part of a study of jury
selection conducted by Hans Zeisel and Shari Diamond in twelve crimi-
nal trials in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of jinois.51
The trials lasted from several hours to three weeks, with criminal charges
ranging from draft evasion to conspiracy and extortion. The three judges
in the study excused fifty jurors for cause. The attorneys exercised a
total of 102 peremptory challenges and in each instance were asked to
complete a form on each juror they challenged indicating the basis for
their challenge. The attorneys filled out forms on eighty-two of the per-
emptory challenges.5 2
The reasons given by attorneys for their peremptory challenges
ranged from occupation (e.g., prospective juror in a case involving mail
fraud worked in shipping and receiving) and family ties (e.g., husband
50 See sources cited supra notes 6-7; see also JEFFEREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JuRy: ThE
JURY SYSTEM AND T=E IDEAL OF DEMOcRACY, 136-37 (1994).
51 See Hans Zeisel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury
and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491 (1978); Shari
S. Diamond & Hans Zeisel, A Courtroom Experiment on Jury Selection and Decision-Making,
1 PERSONAL=TY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 276 (1974).
52 All but one prosecutor and two defense attorneys completed the forms. These three
attorneys excused a total of eighteen jurors. In two other cases the attorneys did not give
reasons for excusing one of the jurors: one attorney did not remember excusing the juror and
another could not remember his reason for the challenge.
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employed as a police officer) to demeanor (e.g., "looks like an FBI agent
and appeared to be a snob") and attributes now prohibited in the wake of
Batson (i.e., race and gender). Table I shows the distribution of the 117
reasons they gave.5 3 Using the voir dire transcripts, courtroom observa-
tions by one of the authors (S.D.), and the reasons given by the attorneys,
we can learn something about the pre-Batson era and the circumstances
under which challenges for cause were granted. We can also learn what
TABLE I
REASONS GIVEN BY ATroRNEys FOR
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Number of Challenges* Number of Cases
Occupation/work history 30 11
General: self 13 9
friend or relative 9 4
Case-related: self 6 5
friend or relative 2 1
Demeanor/appearance 29 11
Weak, immature, timid 5 3
Bossy, assertive 5 5
Critical, hostile, stem, grim 6 4
General, unspecified 7 5
Other** 8 6
Comprehension/hearing/speaking difficulty 7 3
Prior jury service 9 5
Politics 4 2
Crime-related experience (e.g., victim,
drug-user) 3 2
Age 11 7
Youth 3 3
Old Age 8 5
Area where juror lives 4 2
Batson-barred Reasons 11 4
Race: White 6 2
Black 2 1
Gender: Male 0 0
Female 6 3
Miscellaneous 4 4
* Subcategories may sum to a number greater than the category
total if some attorneys gave more than one reason within the
category.
**Included 3 too intelligent, I not intelligent enough.
53 There are more reasons than challenges because attorneys sometimes gave more than
one reason for excusing a particular juror.
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a more generous standard for challenges for cause might produce, and
the role played by what are now impermissible grounds for challenge.
Jurors were challenged for cause in seven of the eleven trials for
which we have voir dire transcripts. 54 Thirty of the thirty-three jurors
removed for cause explicitly said that they could not be fair to one or
both sides. Only three jurors were excused for cause without directly
expressing an inability to be fair. The first was a potential juror in an
extortion case who, apparently hard of hearing, was excused by the judge
after she failed to respond when her name was called. The second was a
potential juror in a draft evasion case who said she had been very close to
a nephew who was killed in Vietnam. The judge told her that attitudes
about the war were irrelevant and asked if she could be fair. She said she
would try to be fair and the judge told her that was not enough and
excused her. The third was a juror in the same case who appeared rather
confused. The juror initially said that he did not believe in'getting out of
the draft. After some explanation from the judge, the juror stated that he
could make a decision based only on the evidence and the judge's in-
structions. The juror started to speak again when the judge asked if any-
one felt he or she could not be fair. The judge then excused the juror
without further questioning. In sum, all but one of the jurors excused for
cause gave strong indications that they would find it difficult or impossi-
ble to be fair and impartial.
Among those jurors who said they could not be fair, three said sim-
ply that they could not be fair without indicating why, but all of the
remaining jurors gave specific reasons. For example, one juror in a drug
case said he could not be objective because he was a U.S. Treasury
agent. Another said that he could not be fair because he personally had
experimented with drugs. In a case of fraud involving a mail-order
house, a juror who worked at Sears said that he might have problems
being impartial. An accountant in a case involving fraudulent prepara-
tion of income tax forms said he could not be fair because he did not see
how anyone could misfile a report. Thirteen of the jurors in six different
cases mentioned either their occupation or the occupation of a close
friend or relative, seven of them involving law enforcement. The largest
concentration of reasons occurred in the draft evasion case, in which six
jurors said they could not be fair in light of their feelings or experiences
with the military. Others mentioned a variety of reasons (e.g., ethnic
sympathy [the juror and the defendant were Italian-Americans]; prior
knowledge about the case; the age of a juror's daughter [in a drug case];
prior victimization). Only two of the twenty-nine jurors who ga, e rea-
54 Except where otherwise noted, the data reported here were previously unpublished and
the analyses were conducted specifically for this article. The original data are on file with one
of the authors, Shari Seidman Diamond.
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sons why they could not be fair gave socially undesirable explanations:
one juror said he had experimented with drugs, and a second juror said
he had been convicted of grand larceny seven years previously. Thus, no
juror said he or she was unwilling to follow the judge's instructions or
refused to accept the presumption of innocence.
Which of the jurors excused on a peremptory challenge might have
been eliminated under a more generous standard for granting challenges
for cause? We considered the explanations given by each attorney who
excused a juror and we identified challenges that might pass muster if
judges exercised their power more actively to remove jurors for cause.
Although judges currently have wide discretion in excusing jurors for
cause, they are generally reluctant to remove a juror who says he or she
can be fair, and appellate courts generally defer to that judgment.55 As
we have seen, nearly all of the jurors removed for cause in these cases
said that they could not be fair. Because attorneys can exercise peremp-
tory challenges to remove jurors who give signs that they may not be
impartial, judges need not feel compelled to use the authority of the state
to dismiss a juror who claims he or she can perform the duties expected
of a juror. Of course, judicial reluctance to excuse for cause means that
an attorney must use one of the limited number of peremptory challenges
that might otherwise by applied to another juror.
If peremptory challenges were eliminated or if fewer peremptories
were allotted to each party, judges might be more vigilant in policing
potential bias or inadequacy on the part of prospective jurors. What ef-
fect would greater vigilance have produced in these cases? We identified
twenty of the eighty-two challenged jurors who might have been re-
moved with a more generous use of the challenge for cause.56 The first
category included three jurors employed in case-related jobs, which
might have led each of these jurors to have particular sympathy for the
alleged victim of the offense. One juror worked for the railroad in a case
involving theft from interstate shipment. Two other jurors were em-
ployed in shipping in a case involving an alleged attempt to defraud a
mail-order house. The second category included two jurors in a drug
case who either had friends who experimented with marijuana or used it
themselves. The third category covered jurors connected in some way to
others in the case: one juror happened to work with a previously ac-
cepted juror and a second juror worked in the same place as one of the
defendants. In the fourth category were seven challenged jurors who
55 See, e.g., United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. Rose, 589
P.2d 5, 13 (Ariz. 1978) (holding that an appellate court will not reverse a judge's ruling on a
challenge for cause absent a palpable abuse of discretion).
56 The attorneys supplied us with the reasons for their challenges. See Diamond &
Zeisel, supra note 51, at 277.
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might have had some difficulty in their language skills, appeared inatten-
tive in court, or seemed to have trouble hearing. Finally, the last cate-
gory included six jurors who were close relatives of police officers. 57
Even under an expansive interpretation of the challenge for cause, it
is unlikely that all of these jurors would be removed. For example, the
wholesale exclusion of all close relatives of police officers from all crim-
inal cases is arguably over-inclusive. Yet, even if all of these twenty
jurors were removed, that would still leave sixty-two jurors who would
not be covered by challenge for cause. For example, while the defense
attorney in one case thought it was significant that a prospective juror
gave his last name first and was concerned that the juror was quite defer-
ential to the judge, those behaviors do not constitute the kind of clear
signals of bias that would enable a judge to dismiss a juror.58 Moreover,
an expanded use of challenges for cause would have eliminated nine of
the thirty jurors excused on peremptory challenge based on occupation or
work history, but it would have had little effect on the group of chal-
lenges based on less tangible attributes of demeanor and appearance,
which constituted the largest remaining category of reasons for peremp-
tory challenge. A juror's assertiveness or stem appearance is not
grounds for dismissal for cause, even though litigants may feel uneasy
about having such jurors decide their fate.
Would Batson and its progeny have prevented attorneys from exer-
cising some of these remaining peremptory challenges? Of the twelve
cases we examined, five involved black defendants, one involved two
Hispanic co-defendants, and the remaining six involved white defend-
ants. All defendants with the exception of one of the two Hispanic co-
defendants were males. The attorneys in the study gave fourteen race- or
gender-based explanations for challenging eleven jurors, reasons for ex-
cusing jurors that would be impermissible now.59 All of these challenges
occurred in four of the six cases involving minority defendants. Under
Batson and its progeny, if the attorney can supply at least one race- (or
gender-) neutral explanation for the challenge, the removal of the juror
will be acceptable unless the attorney also mentions that race or gender
accounted in part for the challenge.60 In exercising all but one of the
57 One of these jurors, a young man who was the son of a twenty-five year veteran police
officer, had been the subject of a side-bar between the attorneys and the judge. The defense
attorney asked to have the juror removed for cause, and the judge refused.
58 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 356 So. 2d 769, 772 (Ala. Ct. App. 1978) ("To disqualify a
prospective juror he must have more than a bias, or fixed opinion, as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused. His opinion must be so fixed that it would bias the verdict the juror would be
required to render.").
59 A combination of race and gender was mentioned as the reason for three of the
challenges.
60 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
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challenges in which race or gender was listed as a reason, the attorney
mentioned at least one other neutral reason that might have allowed the
challenge to survive a Batson charge if the attorney avoided mentioning
the additional race or gender basis for the challenge (the reason given for
the single remaining challenge was that the juror was a black woman).
Thus, we might expect that nearly all of the race- and gender-based chal-
lenges that were visible in this study would not be visible in the post-
Batson courtroom.
Based on these results, we anticipate that a litigant in a system with-
out peremptory challenges would be required to accept a jury that in-
cludes many members whom the litigant would prefer to excuse. That
does not mean that the jurors eliminated by peremptory challenge would
actually be biased against the party who wished to excuse them. Indeed,
there is some evidence that attorneys in the standard judge-conducted
voir dire have only limited success in identifying unfriendly jurors. 61 It
does mean that litigants would be deprived of the opportunity to remove
apparently unfriendly prospective jurors, potentially undermining their
confidence in the impartiality of the jury.62 To preserve the ability of
litigants to participate in selecting the members of their jury, a modest
alternative to eliminating peremptory challenges might be to curtail se-
verely the number of challenges allocated to each party. Limiting the
number of peremptory challenges to three, for example, would make it
impossible for an attorney to remove four black jurors even if Batson's
prohibition of race-based peremptory challenges failed to stop him or
her. That approach, however, would not prevent attorneys from using ill-
informed hunches and stereotypes in exercising even those few chal-
lenges. It is not the irrationality of the attorneys that inhibits the rational
exercise of the peremptory challenge, but rather the weak information
attorneys typically have about the jurors when they exercise those
challenges.
IV. THE LIMITS OF VOIR DIRE FOR DISCLOSING
JUROR BIAS
Voir dire in the typical trial presents only a limited opportunity to
explore the biases of potential jurors so that the attorney can make in-
formed decisions about peremptory strikes. While the intent of voir dire
is to encourage jurors to reveal attitudes or experiences that may affect
their ability to be fair, research on juror disclosure during voir dire indi-
cates that jurors often provide incomplete, and sometimes explicitly inac-
61 See Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 51 at 517.
62 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCE-
DURAL JUSTICE 94-110 (1988). The authors describe many studies showing that control and
1iarticipation increase perceptions of fairness and legitimacy.
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curate, information about their attitudes and backgrounds.63 Seltzer,
Venuti, and Lopes observed the jury selection in thirty-one criminal tri-
als, recording all juror responses to the voir dire questions.6a They then
conducted post-trial interviews with the jurors who actually served on the
juries, asking each juror some of the questions that the juror had an-
swered during the voir dire (e.g., have you or any of your close family
members or friends been a victim of a crime?).65
During the interviews, jurors mentioned experiences that they had
not reported when they were asked about them during voir dire.66 Ap-
proximately twenty-five percent of jurors who did not disclose during the
voir dire that they or a family member had been a victim of a crime
reported in the interview that they or a family member had been a victim
of crime.67 Similarly, thirty percent of the jurors reported knowing a law
enforcement officer even though they did not disclose that information
during voir dire.68
In addition, jurors revealed attitudinal information during the post-
trial interview that they did not disclose during voir dire.69 During voir
dire, jurors were asked several due process questions designed to probe,
for instance, whether they incorrectly believed that the defendant had the
burden of proof or that the defendant should not be presumed innocent.70
During voir dire, no jurors disclosed any disagreement with the due pro-
cess issues, yet during the post-trial interviews many jurors revealed their
disagreement on these same issues.71
Although judges typically believe that they can obtain full disclo-
sure from jurors, research by Susan Jones suggests that such confidence
is unwarranted. 72 Jones compared the impact of judge- versus attorney-
conducted voir dire, as well as the impact of the interpersonal style of
judges and attorneys, on juror candor.73 Jury-eligible participants en-
gaged in a mock voir dire that was conducted by either an attorney or a
judge who used either a personal, informal interpersonal style or a formal
interpersonal style.74 The jurors gave verbal responses during the voir
63 See Richard Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 19 J. CIUM. JuST. 451,460
(1991).
64 See id. at 453.
65 See id. at 454.
66 See id. at 455-56.
67 See id. at 455.
68 See id at 456.
69 See id. at 457.
70 See id.
71 For instance, approximately 47 percent of the jurors responded during the interview
that if a defendant testifies at trial, he has to prove his innocence in at least some cases.
72 Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investi-
gation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HuM. BryAv. 131 (1987).
73 Id. at 136.
74 See id.
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dire, and the attitudes expressed during the voir dire were compared to
the attitudes the jurors expressed in a written questionnaire that was com-
pleted prior to the voir dire. Participants altered their responses almost
twice as much during judge-conducted voir dire as during attorney-con-
ducted voir dire.75
Furthermore, though the public verbal responses to the attorney
were more consistent with the earlier more private written responses
when the attorney used a personal style rather than a formal style, the
consistency of responses to the judge did not vary with the style the
judge used.76 Jones concluded that jurors were less forthcoming during a
judge-conducted voir dire than during an attorney-conducted voir dire.77
Even when judges attempted to be friendly and unassuming, judges still
exerted considerable pressure on jurors to behave in a way that they per-
ceived to be acceptable to the judge. 78 In sum, Jones's research suggests
that jurors are somewhat reluctant to provide honest and complete an-
swers to voir dire questions, especially when questioned by judges.
Juror disclosure might be less than frank and complete for several
reasons. First, jurors who are highly motivated to serve may be reluctant
to describe experiences or opinions they believe will cause them to ap-
pear undesirable as jurors and to be excused from service.79 Second,
jurors may be hesitant to reveal experiences or attitudes that would em-
barrass them in front of the judge, the attorneys, and the venire.80 This
may be exaggerated because the courtroom is not only open to the pub-
lic, but is also equipped with a court reporter who records the entire
proceeding.
Third, some jurors may be too self-conscious or shy to speak in
public, regardless of how personal they perceive the question to be. Ju-
rors are generally questioned in the courtroom before an audience con-
sisting of the judge, the court reporter, the attorneys, the parties, and their
fellow prospective jurors as well as any members of the public who hap-
pen to be present in the courtroom. Public speaking presents a common
anxiety-provoking situation,8t which includes several elements that tend
to increase the speaker's apprehension about communicating with others:
(1) the novelty of a situation (the courtroom is unfamiliar to most jurors);
75 See id. at 143.
76 See id. at 144.
77 Id. at 143-44.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 145.
80 For instance, potential jurors who are called to serve in a trial involving a drug crime
may be asked about their own drug use or the drug use of friends or family members. The
jurors may not admit as much if that disclosure would embarrass them or someone close to
them.
81 See Joe Ayres et al., Two Empirical Tests of a Videotape Designed to Reduce Public
Speaking Anxiety, 21 J. APPLIED COMM. REs. 132-47 (1993).
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(2) the formality of a situation (the courtroom is formal); (3) the
speaker's conspicuousness (the juror being questioned individually is the
focus of all trial participants); (4) the speaker's lower status (the juror
may feel subordinate to the judge and the attorneys); (5) the speaker's
unfamiliarity with those to whom he or she is communicating (the court-
room is filled with strangers); 6) the speaker's perceived dissimilarity
with those to whom he or she is communicating; and (7) the degree of
attention the speaker receives from others.8 2 A situation in which the
speaker anticipates being evaluated is also a cause of anxiety.83 All of
these factors make the voir dire a situation in which many jurors are
likely to feel some communication anxiety. Moreover, this communica-
tion anxiety may cause communication avoidance,84 discouraging the ju-
ror from speaking freely.
Fourth, in addition to the difficulty jurois have in revealing embar-
rassing experiences, jurors may be hesitant to reveal opinions that they
believe might engender disapproval from the judge or others.85 For in-
stance, jurors may want to avoid admitting that they do not accept prac-
tices that guarantee a defendant's constitutional right to due process.
Even if a juror at first boldly admits to an opinion that could dis-
qualify her from service, judges frequently attempt to rehabilitate the ju-
ror, and the juror may have great difficulty maintaining her unacceptable
stance under such pressure. For example, the following exchange oc-
curred between the judge and a juror during voir dire in a federal crimi-
nal case in Illinois:8 6
Judge: "You are satisfied that if the Government failed to
prove the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable
doubt, you would find them innocent, right?"
Juror: "I have to think about it."
Judge: "I am going to tell you if the Government failed to
prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt you will
have to find them innocent, if you are a good and
proper juror in the case. You understand?"
82 See James C. McCroskey, The Communication Apprehension Perspective, in Avomo-
ING COMMUNICATION: SHYNESS, REICENCE, AND COMMUNICATION APPREHENSION 13-38
(John A. Daly & James C. McCroskey eds., 1984); see also Arnold H. Buss, SELF-CONSCIOUS-
NESS AND SOCIAL ANXIETY 165-219 (1980).
83 See John A. Daly & Arnold H. Buss, The Transitory Causes of Audience Anxiety, in
AVOMING COMMUNICATION: SHYNEqSS, REmCENCE, AND COMMUNICATION APPREHENSION,
supra note 82, at 67-78.
84 See McCroskey, supra note 82, at 35 (avoidance is a common behavioral response to
high communication anxiety); see also id. at 26.
85 See DOUGLAS P. CROWNE, THE EXPERIMENTAL STUDy OF PERSONALITY, 156-60
(1979) (individuals may misrepresent themselves to avoid social disapproval).
86 This is an excerpt from one of the cases discussed in Section I that we analyzed for
this article.
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Juror: "Yes."
Judge: "You can do that?"
Juror: "I will see."
Judge: "All right."
The judge in this exchange may have educated the juror or extracted
a commitment that the juror would honor the legal standard, but a strong
competing description is that he merely succeeded in getting the juror to
say the magic words that would please the judge without producing a
change in the juror's views or in the juror's ability or willingness to fol-
low the legal standard. Middendorf and Luginbuhl found evidence of a
similar molding of juror responses.8 7 Jurors who viewed other jurors
being questioned in a simulated voir dire before they were questioned
were more likely to endorse due process issues than those who were not
exposed to a voir dire prior to their own participation. 88 Middendorf and
Luginbuhl described this effect of exposure to others' responses to voir
dire questions as positive, arguing that increased endorsement of due
process values resulted because those values were explained and ex-
plored during voir dire.89 The alternative explanation, they also ac-
knowledge, is that jurors simply learned to give responses that would not
lead the judge or attorneys to excuse them.90
Even when jurors are motivated to be completely honest during voir
dire, their responses may be inaccurate. People are often unable to rec-
ognize the extent to which their experiences or attitudes affect their judg-
ments.91 For example, a prospective juror who has four close family
members who are police officers may not be able to gauge whether her
relationships with those individuals will affect her ability to consider im-
partially the testimony of the police officers testifying for the govern-
ment in a criminal case. Indeed, in any particular case it may be
impossible for anyone to determine whether the juror will be improperly
influenced by her prior history. Even the juror who reports that she
could not be fair, leading the judge to excuse her for cause, may be so
87 Kathi Middendorf & James Luginbuhl, The Value of a Nondirective Voir Dire Style in
Jury Selection, 22 CRiM. JUST. & BEHAV. 129 (1995).
88 See id.
89 Id. at 145-46.
90 See id. at 145.
91 See, e.g., Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for
Unconscious Alteration of Judgments, 35 J. PERsoNALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 250 (1977) (par-
ticipants in four studies were unable to articulate the effects that situations had on their behav-
ior, indicating that people have difficulty identifying the causes of their own behavior);
Timothy D. Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal Reports About the Effects of
Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 118 (1978) (par-
ticipants were unaware of the effects that a target person's manner of presentation had on their
judgments about other attributes of the target person).
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concerned about fairness and so motivated to deal equitably with both
sides that she overestimates the effects of her initial reactions.
In sum, the typical voir dire entails a number of obstacles that re-
duce the information attorneys receive about the likely biases of potential
jurors. In our view, the only serious way to combat these limitations is to
address their sources and to modify voir dire so that jurors are en-
couraged to reveal socially undesirable characteristics and unpopular
attitudes.
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR BOLSTERING BATSON
When voir dire is limited, jurors are less likely to reveal biases that
will justify an excuse for cause. Attorneys, therefore, must rely primarily
on superficial cues or stereotypes (e.g., giving the last name first indi-
cates a willingness to accept state authority) in exercising their peremp-
tory challenges. Stereotype utilization increases when the decision-
maker is under a high cognitive demand and when individuating infor-
mation is not available. 92 Thus, during the judge-conducted voir dire of
a typical trial in which attorneys are faced with multiple competing de-
mands and do not have much information specific to the individual ju-
rors, stereotypes are likely to be the primary foundation for their
peremptory challenges. The way to reduce the use of these hunches and
stereotypes is to provide the attorneys with better information.
The information available to the court and the parties is influenced
by the way the voir dire is conducted. Although the trend is toward both
a more limited voir dire93 and one which is increasingly conducted by the
judge, 94 there is evidence that the increased efficiency is purchased at
significant cost by reducing the information it produces.95 Nietzel and
Dillehay studied the role played by varying procedures in jury selection
in thirteen capital murder trials.96 Cases involving voir dire in which
potential jurors were individually sequestered during the entire time they
were questioned by judges and attorneys resulted in more sustained de-
fense challenges for cause than cases in which jurors were questioned
only en masse in open court. 97 Nietzel and Dillehay suggest that this
92 See generally David Hamilton & Jeff Sherman, Stereotypes, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
COGNITON 5 (Robert Wyler & Thomas Srull eds., 1994) (When individuals must attend to a
variety of internal and/or external stimuli, they cannot give attention to individuating informa-
tion, so they are more likely to rely on stereotypes.).
93 See ANN FAGAN GINGER, JURY SELECrION IN CIVIL & CRMINAL TaIs §8.40 (2d. ed.
1984).
94 See BERMANT & SHAFARD, supra note 8, at 81.
95 See Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay, The Effects of Variations in Voir Dire
Procedures in Capital Murder Trials, 6 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 1 (1991).
96 See id. at 5.
97 See id. at 8.
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difference emerged because sequestered individual questioning promotes
more complete disclosure of juror bias through the use of more individu-
ally tailored questions. 98 An additional explanation may be that the ju-
rors were not censoring their responses because of what they heard other
jurors say; the sequestered, individually questioned jurors had no access
to the "correct" responses of others.
The form of questioning can also encourage or discourage disclo-
sure. In the cases from the Zeisel and Diamond study,99 the judges
tended to ask closed-ended questions (e.g., would you be satisfied to
have a jury composed of twelve people like you? Does anyone have a
problem applying the law as I instruct you?). Both attorneys and judges
may unwittingly engage in the kind of leading, directive questioning that
inhibits self-disclosure. For instance, Middendorf and Luginbuhl had
participants listen to judicial instructions on such due process issues as
the presumption of innocence, the state's burden of proof, reasonable
doubt, the defendant's right not to testify, and the defendant's right to
present no evidence. 100
Then, in the second phase of the experiment, the participants under-
went questioning on these issues. 01 Jurors who underwent a non-direc-
tive questioning were significantly more likely to disagree with due
process issues and were more self-disclosing (i.e., expressed more doubt
about their ability to abide by due process guarantees) than were those
who underwent directive questioning, 10 2 suggesting that jurors are more
able to admit biases when they undergo non-directive as opposed to di-
rective questioning.
Finally, although individual questioning and attorney-conducted
voir dire may increase the time required for jury selection, one proposal
that could facilitate juror disclosure without increasing costs is an ex-
panded use of juror questionnaires. Jurors who are reluctant to disclose
information in a crowded courtroom may be willing to write down sensi-
tive or personal information on a questionnaire. 10 3 Moreover, the re-
sponses to the questions on the questionnaire cannot contaminate or be
contaminated by the responses of other jurors answering the same
questions.
The call for more extensive voir dire is at odds with the recent push
toward reducing time spent in jury selection. In trials that have attracted
98 See id. at 10.
99 Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 51.
100 Middendorf & Luginbuhl, supra note 87, at 133.
101 See id. at 133-34.
102 See id. at 142-45.
103 See generally Dennis Bilecki, Efficient Method of Jury Selection for Lengthy Trials,
73 JUDICATURE 43 (1989) (a study of the effect of pre-voir dire questionnaires on the costs
associated with jury selection in complex trials).
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significant media coverage, however, courts have recognized the need to
explore the potential effects of pre-trial publicity and other predisposi-
tions that may influence juror behavior.' 04 What we suggest here is that
one way to ensure impartial juries and to discourage attorneys from exer-
cising stereotype-based challenges is simply to apply the standards usu-
ally reserved for high-profile jury trials to jury trials in general.
How does an expanded voir dire comport with the goal of an impar-
tial jury? There is a potential tension between a jury that is representa-
tive of the community and one that will provide the litigants with an
impartial decision-maker. A representative jury may be representative of
a prejudiced community. A full voir dire with a system of peremptory
challenges may be the only way to reduce the likelihood that jurors who
are unaware of their biases or who are unwilling to admit to them will be
seated on a jury. This may be the only way to ensure that the unpopular
defendant receives a trial before an impartial jury. In the wave of sup-
port for eliminating peremptory challenges as a way of shoring up Bat-
son, we should not ignore the role that peremptory challenges can play in
ensuring an impartial jury. Moreover, if attorneys are given the opportu-
nity to make judgments based on individuals rather than images, they
may be less likely to rely on snap-shot racial stereotypes in their judg-
ments about potential jurors.
104 See, e.g., FRED S. SIEBERT ET AL., FREE PRESS AND FAm TRIAL: SoME DIMENSIONS OF
TM PROBLEM 6-11 (Bush ed., 1970) (found that 92% of judges relied on voir dire as well as
judicial admonition in order to address jury bias).
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